This paper addresses issues related to the ethical consequences of using AI technologies in court decisions. With the prodigious technological leap made in the eld of articial intelligence in recent years, disruptive innovations have aected many business sectors, with economic, social and ethical consequences.
INTRODUCTION
Articial intelligence (AI) can be considered as "a set of scientic methods, theories and techniques whose aim is to reproduce, by a machine, the cognitive abilities of human beings" [7] . Today AI can prove invaluable in helping in the legal eld. More specically applied to judicial decisions, two uses of AI can be found:
(1) the studies on the justications of judicial decisions, from a perspective of basic research, in order to identify judicial decision explanation and know the share of the law and judges in the building of the court decisions (2) the development of 'predictive justice' tools, from a business point of view, in order to anticipate the chances of success of a case or for example the amounts of compensation in civil proceedings.
While the rst form of use is highly framed and restricted to members of the research community alone, the second form is not. Following the classical research process, the production of knowledge on how justice is done is realized under the critical supervision of pairs. The contributions of AI on judicial decisions studies in a research perspective are then made according to established ethical rules specic to the scientic approach process. It is not the case for predictive justice, which potentially aects the entire civil society when it is aected by judicial decisions and thus requires the production of appropriate ethical rules.
In 2012, a journal article has presented in a 50-paper selection a retrospective of 25 years of publications of the International Conference on AI and Law [4] . The article's introduction was ended with reference to the fact that technology advances rapidly in computer science and that "the emergence of the World Wide Web in particular has had an enormous impact on legal informatics, both what is feasible and what is desirable. "
Concerning the 'desirability' contained in this statement, an implicit but crucial element concerns the subject of this desirability. Do we all have the same expectations -or the same wishes-regarding the applications of AI technologies to law? What do people really want? Do magistrates, lawyers, litigants, public authorities, researchers in the eld of law or Legal Tech companies want the same things? Through the proposal of a general methodology for studying the ethical consequences of the introduction of new technologies in a given domain, this paper presents the result obtained by a multidisciplinary working group interested by the application of AI technologies in court decisions in the French legal system.
STATE OF THE ART
At the turn of the 2000s, various interdisciplinary groups were formed to look at the consequences of ethical aspects related to AI in North America or Europe (e.g., the Future of Humanity Institute founded at the University of Oxford in 2005, or the Future of Life Institute in Boston area in 2014). A new eld of research was born during this period: 'machine ethics' [3] . These various initiatives have recently led to a set of guidelines for AI research: the "23 Asilomar AI Principles. " 1 In the early 2010s, with the establishment of powerful companies in the digital world, researchers, members of the civil society and Internet activists have wondered about the use these companies make of our data and the personal and social implications it has [13] . But the use of personal data is not the only purpose and we have to wonder about the personal and social implications of the use of articial intelligence as a solution to make automatic decisions instead of human's decisions, as administrative decisions or judicial decisions. Reections are in progress in North America, as the subproject "Ethical and Socio-Political Issues of AI and Autonomization," about the use of algorithms for justice in Canada, 2 or in Europe, e.g., in the European Union with a report on "Ethical guidelines for trustworthy AI" 3 or in the Council of Europe with the publication of an "European Ethical Charter on the Use of Articial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and their environment" [7] .
GENERAL METHODOLOGY
Applied ethics focuses on situations where there are dierent stakeholders with dierent and conicting interests. In such circumstances, John Rawls argued that 'reasonable' or 'justiable' principles are required which enable us to determine which actions would be 'just and right' [14] . For Rawls, such principles should be acceptable to any impartial competent judges, and it is required that the judgment be intuitive with respect to ethical principles.
Following this Rawlsian decision-making tradition, the ethical matrix developed by Ben Mepham uses a 'principled' approach to ethics [10, 12] . Initially intended to provide help on bioethical issues (e.g., the use of genetically modied shes [9] or policy interventions in the obesity crisis [11] , the ethical matrix has become a valuable versatile tool for analysing ethical issues in technology assessment, and has been designed as "an aid to rational thought and democratic deliberation, not a substitute for them". As originally conceived by its author for ethical questions about the impact of new technologies in food and agriculture, "the ethical matrix is based on three ethical principles, respect for wellbeing, for autonomy and for justice. These three principles are not mutually exclusive and they cannot be said to exhaust every legitimate ethical concern. " These three principles constitute in practice values which form the columns of the matrix. The rows of the matrix consist of the 'interest groups' -dierent groups of people and also non-humans (e.g., animals, plants, environment)-caught up with the issue in question. Each cell of the matrix species the main criterion which would be met if a particular principle were respected for a particular interest group. So, the structure of the ethical matrix consists of stakeholders on the y-axis, principles on the x-axis, and questions and answers in their intersections. The ethical matrix can then be seen as a checklist of concerns, structured around established ethical theory, but it can also be used as a means of provoking structured discussion between the dierent interest groups.
Nevertheless, the study and evaluation of the ethical matrix highlight some limitations of this approach, especially for certain points of a given principle, if some of them express an advantage or a violation of the principle [15] . How could the dierent facts be weighed against each other? The ethical matrix does not give an answer to this rather essential question.
Changes to the content can be made by considering the x-and/or the y-axis exible in terms of content, and then a choice can be made to decide which principles and which stakeholders can be included in the matrix. We must take into consideration the legitimacy of the stakeholders. Some of them do not have the ability to represent themselves but their interests will be aected by the introduction of this new technology. Depending on the context, two dierent approaches can be followed: (1) in a top-down approach, the specications of the ethical matrix principles are largely set by the organizers, which can may appear to be undemocratic, and is more vulnerable to intentional or unintentional abuse, and (2) a bottom-up approach, where the organizers provide less explicit guidance, and defer to the majority views of the (usually) inexpert participants in specifying the principles and conducting ethical deliberation.
OUR APPROACH 4.1 Motivation
In France, the consequences of the French law voted in 2016 (October 10) "loi pour une République numérique" to provide public access to all decisions rendered by the courts have sparked much debate. In the context of this intellectual eervescence, a series of reection workshops was organized to discuss the knowledge, concerns and problems of the dierent actors involved in these developments, from a theoretical perspective.
It seems to us relevant to nd a way to use and adapt the ethical matrix, in order to structure the debates and to identify the dierences of points of view implied by the dierent stakeholders in the case of the introduction of articial intelligence in the legal eld, better identify the ethical issues associated [10, 12] .
The subject area can then be dened as the introduction of AI technologies in the eld of law in France, and the ethical concerns about the three parts of the whole process:
(1) at the input of the system: access to the data constituting the documents of the court decisions -data that will feed the machine learning models-with questions about privacy preserving concerns [1, 2] (2) the automated system as such: implementation of decision models simulating judgments learned on a large set of court decisions made by (human) judges, and their consequences on biases associated with the learning model, e.g., risk of producing models of stereotyped judgments in the presence of implicit discrimination in the data, hence the need for adapted treatment strategies, such as the management of imbalanced datasets [6, 8] 
Workshop Organization
To personalize the ethical matrix, we need to dene the relevant interest groups -i.e., the dierent stakeholders aected by the introduction of the AI in the legal eld-, and specify the principles for each interest group -i.e., retain a number of values relevant to this type of ethical problem. The positioning of the stakeholders was done via the workshop. Denition of the selected values was made through the study of the principles presented by the European Commission for the Eciency of Justice (CEPEJ) which we will detail below. To promote exchanges and the construction of shared knowledge, this workshop was organized in the form of ve successive sessions, between September 2018 and February 2019. Each, over a full day, allows to hear three or four speakers, allows time for discussion, and is the subject of a detailed report to ensure a better collection of knowledge, especially as each member of the seminar can be prevented from participating in this or that session.
Workshop Participants
The selection of participants for the workshop was made in order to have the maximum diversity of views, interests and opinions on the subject. The stakeholders represented in this seminar are the researchers at the initiative of this project and representatives of several disciplines (law, computer science, economy), but also practitioners (lawyers and magistrates), representatives of the institutions concerned (Ministry of Justice, Bar) and legal publishers who participate in the Legal Tech movement and wish to produce new data for the legal world. These actors have been fairly widely recruited from a call for contributions. The topics covered are the eects of these tools of decision-making on the very conception of law and jurisprudence in a country of written law (questions of the renewal of the modes of production of the right), on the treatment of cases (assessment of quantums, role of the judge, increased mediation) or the possible judge proling as a means of highlighting the uncertainty of the law, leaving aside voluntarily the stakes protection of personal data widely treated elsewhere.
Selected Values
To clarify the principles relevant to each interest group, certain values had to be chosen to construct the ethical matrix. So, we conducted a literature search on various sources, e.g., the 'Universal Values' identied by Shalom H. Schwartz [16] , a list of necessary values for the proper functioning of life in society published in a recent French book [5] , and some principles that must necessarily be guaranteed according to an organization such as the European Commission for the Eciency of Justice (CEPEJ). In the "European Ethical Charter on the Use of Articial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and their environment" adopted by the CEPEJ during its 31 st Plenary meeting (Strasbourg, 3-4 December 2018), under the aegis of the Council of Europe [7] , ve principles are considered essential.
The rst principle (Principle 1) of using articial intelligence in judicial systems and their environment is to ensure that the design and implementation of articial intelligence tools and services are compatible with the principle of respect for fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Convention on the Protection of Personal Data ("Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, " ETS No. 108 as amended by the Council of Europe Treaty Series (CETS) amending protocol No. 223). The reference to the ECHR is particularly aimed at the intangible right of access to a judge, necessarily independent and impartial, capable of leading a contradictory debate and ensuring the equality of arms and respect for the adversarial process.
Still in reference to fundamental rights, the principle of nondiscrimination (Principle 2) of the CEPEJ Ethical Charter focuses on the development or intensication of any discrimination between individuals or groups of individuals. This Second Principle targets the need to specically prevent the development or intensication of any discrimination between individuals or groups of individuals, provided that the tools used can, via automatic decisions imposed as proposed, resuming pre-existing biases in purely human decisions and thus leading to their perpetuation or reinforcement. The capacity of the computer tools must also be used to expose such discriminations and neutralize them for the future.
The third principle is the principle of quality and security of the tools (Principle 3). As long as they rely on the mass processing of jurisdictional decisions or, more broadly, on judicial data, it is essential to ensure that reliable and certied sources are used and that the data extracted from them are quality models, which implies not only a quality technological environment but also a solid conception, ensured by a multi-disciplinary team. It is indeed necessary to make sure that there is no alteration, voluntary or not, likely to change the content or the meaning of the decisions processed.
This quality requirement is associated with a fourth principle: the principle of transparency, impartiality and fairness (Principle 4). Data processing methods must be accessible, comprehensible and subject to external audits. It is therefore necessary to strike a balance with the rules of intellectual property in order to ensure the primacy of the interests of justice.
The last principle concerns the "use under control" (Principle 5): the tools thus produced must not be prescriptive; they must leave the users -and in particular the magistrates-to be informed of their decisions, remaining enlightened actors and masters of their choices, always likely to return to the initial data and to deviate from the proposed solutions. As for litigants, they must be duly informed of the use of an automatic decision concerning them. They must have the right to oppose it, the right to be assisted and a right of appeal to a court within the meaning of the ECHR.
In the French book Petit Traité des Valeurs [5] ("Little Treatise of Values"), 35 values are proposed. 4 Among them are those that are equivalent to the principles proposed by the CEPEJ Ethical Charter: justice, competency, transparency, equality, usefulness, and privacy.
RESULTS: ETHICAL MATRIX
At the end of these workshops, our collection of information resulted in the ethical matrix presented in Table 1 . In this table, one can meet situations where the positioning of the dierent stakeholders can be similar but with dierent objectives. For example, research and legal knowledge producers as well as Legal Tech companies have every interest in having information about judges, lawyers or litigants. The former need information to carry out longitudinal studies (e.g., for the study of judicial processes of people or companies, or for the study of the dierences of judgments according to the judges), while the latter need information to make machine learning algorithms work, and deep learning only works with large amounts of data (big data). Legal Tech companies may even be tempted to do proling 5 of judges, lawyers or litigants for predicting, respectively, a specic way that a particular judge interprets the law, the skills and chances of success of a given lawyer in a competitive legal world, or the situation of a given litigant to make targeted advertising.
We have written "Not concerned" in some cells of the Table 1 to indicate cases where the considered value is not relevant for a given stakeholder. For example, the value 'justice' has no interest as such for the eld of researchers and producers of legal knowledge in the context of a scientic study, even if it is a value for which researchers are concerned as citizens.
We can notice that the positioning of the values of the public authorities is not mentioned on the Table 1 for two reasons. Firstly, the values considered in the ethical matrix are very dierent from one state to another. Thus, for France and the other countries that have signed the European Convention on Human Rights, the defense of all these values is important, unlike other countries which have made other choices than France and already use articial intelligence technologies in the legal eld. Secondly, because the values of public authorities concern political choices, and the ethical matrix is a tool for positioning the debate on the public stage so that decisions can be taken according to the legislative process in force.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The whole of this series of workshops organized with participants constituted in a multidisciplinary working group aims at giving a maximum of points of view on the expectations, the wishes and the fears concerning the introduction of a predictive model based on AI technologies in the court decision process in France.
Although all of civil society is aected more or less directly by change induced by new technology, it is the lawyers who are in the front line and who need to reinvent their practices. It is thus normal to meet among lawyers the most contrasted opinions concerning the arrival of articial intelligence: some lawyers consider propriété), privacy (la vie privée), righteousness (la vertu), sacred (le sacré), solidarity (la solidarité), sublimate (le sublime), tasty (le savoureux), tradition (la tradition), usefulness (l'utilité), and wellbeing (le bien-être). 5 Proling is dened in section 4 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, EU Regulation 2016/679). It is processing an individual's personal data in order to analyse and predict his/her behavior or his situation, such as determining his/her performance at work, nancial situation, health, preferences, lifestyle habits, etc.
Legal Techs as actors of unfair competition, others consider they are companies providing a new technology to integrate into their practices to reap benets with, in return, a new business model to nd.
The rules of law already produced by French law echo the values set out when they tend to protect litigants. Thus, adopting the rules introduced by Regulation 2016/679 of the European Union, 6 Article 21 of the Law of 20 January 2018 submits the possibility of resorting to algorithmic processing to automatically produce decisions under protective conditions of users.
By imposing transparency, the law entrusts users and their counsels, possibly the source of a judicial remedy, with the role of controlling these tools. With regard to the control of conciliation, mediation or arbitration activities proposed online, the law 7 is preparing to provide in the same way that, when they are proposed "by means of an algorithmic treatment, the person concerned must be informed by an explicit mention and must expressly consent to it." In addition, "the rules dening this treatment, which the person responsible must ensure control and its evolution, as well as the main characteristics of its implementation are communicated to the person who requests it." Finally, online services providing these services "may be certied by an accredited body." We nd the requirement of transparency, here expressly associated with competence and the possibility of users to escape an automated treatment of their situation.
The article 19 of this law "loi de programmation" stipulates the obligation to anonymize court decisions before making them available to the public and decide the debate which has developed around the anonymisation of the names of the magistrates who rendered these decisions and of the registry ocial who participated: Their names will not be obscured, but their identity data "can not be the subject of a reuse the object or eect of which is to evaluate, analyze, compare or predict their actual or alleged professional practices, " under pain of sanctions. The public character of justice (transparency) thus seems to prevail over the claim of a protection of justice professionals via their secret of their identity. It can thus be concluded that there are already a number of laws to protect the dierent parties from the ethical consequences of the introduction of AI into the law system, as well as values considered as priorities over others, but that there are still issues to be covered in an area that evolves very quickly.
Predictive justice tools have their potential but also their limitations. In a world becoming increasingly complex, the appearance of articial intelligence tools in the legal eld must be understood as an aid that legal professionals must be able to seize, and this in order to continue their role: to best defend the interests of the litigants, and then of the citizens.
